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The Supreme Court and Abortion Rights
George J. Annas, J.D., M.P.H.
Since the Supreme Court’s landmark 1973 abor-
tion-rights decision in Roe v. Wade,1 the law has 
taken the lead in defining the contours of the 
continuing public debate over reproductive liberty. 
Ever since then, abortion opponents have tried to 
make abortion more burdensome by limiting Roe, 
and these continuing challenges are the reason 
there have been so many Supreme Court decisions 
about abortion, including the Court’s 1992 deci-
sion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylva-
nia v. Casey,2 which unexpectedly reaffirmed the 
core of Roe.
In the wake of Casey, political efforts to restrict 
abortion have switched to outlawing one specific 
medical procedure, which its opponents label 
“partial-birth abortion,” and more than 30 states 
and the federal government have made it a crime 
to perform this procedure. In 2000, in Stenberg 
v. Carhart,3 the Court ruled 5 to 4 that these laws 
are unconstitutional. In April 2007, also by a 5 to 
4 vote, the Court reached the opposite conclusion 
in Gonzales v. Carhart.4 This is the first time the 
Court has ever held that physicians can be pro-
hibited from using a medical procedure deemed 
necessary by the physician to benefit the patient’s 
health. The importance of the decision to physi-
cians and their patients cannot be appreciated 
without an understanding of the constitutional 
law of reproductive liberty as it has developed 
during the past 40 years.
the right to privac y
The first case to embrace the concept of repro-
ductive liberty was Griswold v. Connecticut, in which 
the Court ruled in 1965 that a Connecticut statute 
criminalizing the use of contraceptives violated 
the constitutional right to privacy that married 
couples had in sexual relations.5 Later, in 1972, 
the Court found that even outside marriage, a per-
son had a “right to privacy . . . to be free from 
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters 
so fundamentally affecting a person as the deci-
sion to bear or beget a child.”6
The following year, in Roe, the Court struck 
down a Texas law that made it a crime for physi-
cians to perform an abortion unless it was neces-
sary to save the life of the patient; there were no 
exceptions for the woman’s health. The Court 
held that women have a constitutional right of 
privacy that is fundamental and “broad enough 
to encompass a woman’s decision . . . to termi-
nate her pregnancy.”1 Because the right is funda-
mental, states that wish to restrict abortion rights 
were required to demonstrate a compelling inter-
est to restrict the exercise of this right. The Court 
ruled that the state’s interest in the life of the 
fetus became compelling only at the point of via-
bility, when the fetus can survive independently 
of its mother. Even after the point of viability, the 
state cannot favor the life of the fetus over the 
life or health of the pregnant woman. Under 
the right of privacy, physicians must be free to 
use their “medical judgment for the preservation 
of the life or health of the mother.”1 On the same 
day that the Court decided Roe, it also decided 
Doe v. Bolton,7 in which the Court defined health 
very broadly:
The medical judgment may be exercised in 
the light of all factors — physical, emo-
tional, psychological, familial, and the 
woman’s age — relevant to the well-being 
of the patient. All these factors may relate 
to health. This allows the attending physi-
cian the room he needs to make his best 
medical judgment.7
Roe and Doe together established that both phy-
sician and patient were protected by the consti-
tutional right of privacy. In later cases, the Court 
continued to defer to the medical judgment of 
the attending physician. For example, in 1976 in 
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, the 
Court concluded that state legislatures could not 
determine when viability occurred; rather this 
“essentially medical concept . . . is, and must 
be, a matter for the judgment of the responsible 
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attending physician.”8 By the end of the 1980s, 
a pattern in Court decisions could be discerned 
in which abortion regulations that significantly 
burdened a woman’s decision, treated abortion 
differently from other similar medical or surgi-
cal procedures, interfered with the exercise of 
professional judgment by the attending physician, 
or were stricter than accepted medical standards 
were struck down by the Court.9
Privacy as a constitutional right became a one-
word description of liberty to make decisions 
regarding marriage, procreation, contraception, 
sterilization, abortion, family relationships, child 
rearing, and sexual relationships free of govern-
mental interference.2,10
the right to libert y
One strategy to change Roe was to change the 
composition of the Supreme Court by appointing 
anti-Roe justices. Because of new justices on the 
Court in 1992, in Casey, the Court had its first real 
opportunity to overturn Roe v. Wade. Many Court 
observers thought it would. Instead, in an un-
usual procedure for the Court, three potentially 
anti-Roe justices, Justices Sandra Day O’Connor, 
David Souter, and Anthony Kennedy, joined to-
gether to write a joint opinion confirming the 
“core holding” of Roe. (They were joined in most 
of their opinion by two justices who would have 
simply upheld Roe, making this a 5-to-4 decision.) 
Most centrally, the authors of the joint opinion 
believed that although the pressure to overrule 
Roe has grown “more intense,” doing so would 
severely and unnecessary damage the Court’s 
legitimacy by undermining “the Nation’s commit-
ment to the rule of law.”2
Specifically, the three justices wrote that they 
were reaffirming “Roe’s essential holding” that 
before the point of viability a woman has a right 
to choose abortion without undue state interfer-
ence, that after the point of viability the state can 
restrict abortion “if the law contains exceptions 
for pregnancies which endanger the woman’s life 
or health,” and that “the state has legitimate in-
terests from the outset of the pregnancy in pro-
tecting the health of the woman and the life of 
the fetus that may become a child.” The Court 
applied these principles to uphold laws mandat-
ing much more detailed requirements for abor-
tion, as well as a mandatory 24-hour waiting 
period, but struck down a spousal-notification 
requirement as an “undue burden.” Thus, after 
Casey, Roe stood for the proposition that pregnant 
women have a “personal liberty” right (“privacy” 
went unmentioned) to choose to terminate their 
pregnancies before the point of viability and that 
the state cannot “unduly burden” such a right 
by erecting barriers that effectively prevent the 
exercise of that choice.2,11 Of course, a major 
problem was definitional: burdensome regula-
tions were acceptable, “unduly burdensome” ones 
were not — but it was not clear what qualified 
as which. Put another way, the state could dem-
onstrate its concern for life by requiring that 
physicians make women seeking abortions jump 
through new and burdensome hoops (including 
offers of detailed and accurate information on 
abortion, the status of the fetus, adoption, sources 
of help for childbirth, and a 24-hour waiting 
period), as long as doing so did not “unduly bur-
den” women by actually preventing them from be-
ing able to make a decision to have an abortion.
With the loss of all hope that the Court 
would overrule Roe wholesale, anti-Roe advocates 
switched strategies dramatically, focusing on 
criminalizing a specific procedure that they be-
lieved would horrify most Americans and that 
they labeled “partial-birth abortion.” The first 
such bill passed Congress in 1996 and was vetoed 
by President Bill Clinton because the prohibition 
did not contain an exception for the health of the 
woman, as required by Roe and Casey. In 1997, 
this time with the support of the American Medi-
cal Association, the bill passed Congress again. 
President Clinton vetoed it, again for failure to 
contain a health exception.12
“partial-birth abortion”  
and the states
Proponents of the ban took their cause to the 
individual states, a majority of which enacted sub-
stantially identical laws. In 2000, Nebraska’s 
partial-birth abortion law reached the Supreme 
Court. The Nebraska law carried a penalty of up 
to 20 years in prison for physicians who performed 
the procedure. The law reads in relevant part:
No partial-birth abortion shall be per-
formed in this state, unless such a proce-
dure is necessary to save the life of the 
mother whose life is endangered by a 
physical disorder, physical illness, or phys-
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ical injury, including a life-endangering 
physical condition caused by or arising 
from the pregnancy itself.
[A “partial-birth abortion” is] an abortion 
procedure in which the person perform-
ing the abortion partially delivers vagi-
nally a living unborn child before killing 
the unborn child and completing the 
delivery. . . . [The statute further defines 
the phrase “partially delivers vaginally a liv-
ing unborn child before killing the unborn 
child” as] deliberately and intentionally 
delivering into the vagina a living unborn 
child, or a substantial portion thereof, for 
the purpose of performing a procedure 
that the person performing such pro-
cedure knows will kill the unborn child 
and does kill the unborn child3 [emphasis 
added].
This ban applies throughout pregnancy and 
has no exception to protect the woman’s health, 
only to save her life. In a 5-to-4 opinion in Sten-
berg v. Carhart,3,13 the Court found this law un-
constitutional for two reasons. First, the descrip-
tion of the banned procedure was too close to 
dilation and evacuation (D&E), another procedure 
that was permitted and widely used for second-
trimester abortions. Therefore, this law would 
discourage physicians from using the lawful pro-
cedure, which would place an undue burden on 
their patients. Second, the law failed to provide 
an exception for instances in which the proce-
dure was deemed necessary by the physician to 
protect the woman’s health, as required by Roe 
and Casey. Justice John Paul Stevens, in his con-
curring opinion, noted that the extreme anti-Roe 
rhetoric as exemplified in the partial-birth abor-
tion debate obscured the fact that during the 27-
year period since Roe was decided, the core hold-
ing of Roe “has been endorsed by all but 4 of the 
17 Justices who have addressed the issue.”3
A notable dissenting opinion was written by 
Justice Kennedy, who had specifically endorsed 
the core of Roe in Casey. Kennedy argued that the 
outlawing of “partial-birth abortion” was consis-
tent with Casey because of the interest the state 
has throughout pregnancy in protecting the life 
of the fetus that may become a child. In his view, 
the banned procedure conflates abortion and 
childbirth in a way that “might cause the medi-
cal profession or society as a whole to become 
insensitive, even disdainful, to life, including life 
of the human fetus.” He also argued that such a 
ban was not unduly burdensome to women be-
cause state legislatures can determine that spe-
cific medical procedures, like this one, are not 
medically necessary.3
“partial-birth abortion”  
and congress
Justice Stephen Breyer, the author of the Stenberg 
majority opinion, stated that a more precise law, 
with a health exception, could be constitutional.3 
In 2003, Congress passed a slightly revised law. 
It did not contain a health exception, but its pref-
ace did contain a declaration that the outlawed 
procedure was never medically necessary for the 
health of the woman. President Bush signed it 
into law on November 5, 2003. By the time the 
Court ruled on the constitutionality of this law 
in April 2007, in Gonzales v. Carhart, there were 
two important changes in the composition of the 
Court: a new chief justice, John Roberts, who re-
placed the consistently anti-Roe Chief William 
Rehnquist, and Justice Samuel Alito, who replaced 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who was consis-
tently pro-Roe (as interpreted in Casey). The federal 
law provides that
(a) Any physician who, in or affecting in-
terstate or foreign commerce, knowingly 
performs a partial birth abortion and 
thereby kills a human fetus shall be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more 
than 2 years, or both. This subsection does 
not apply to a partial birth abortion that is 
necessary to save the life of a mother whose life is 
endangered by a physical disorder, physi-
cal illness, or physical injury, including a 
life-endangering physical condition caused 
by or arising from the pregnancy it-
self. . . .
(b) (1) The term “partial birth” abortion 
means an abortion in which the person 
performing the abortion
(A) Deliberately and intentionally vaginally de-
livers a living fetus until, in the case of a 
head-first presentation, the entire fetal head 
health law, ethics, and human rights
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is outside the body of the mother, or, in the 
case of breech presentation, any part of the 
fetal trunk past the navel is outside the body of the 
mother, for the purpose of performing an 
overt act that the person knows will kill 
the partially delivered living fetus; and
(B) Performs the overt act, other than com-
pletion of delivery, that kills the partially 
delivered living fetus4 [emphasis added].
The Court decided, 5 to 4, that this law was 
constitutional. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority 
opinion for himself, Justices Antonin Scalia and 
Clarence Thomas, and the two new justices. In it 
he substantially adopts his dissenting opinion in 
Stenberg as the Court’s new majority opinion. Al-
though he concludes that his decision is consis-
tent with Stenberg, all three U.S. District courts 
and all three Courts of Appeal that had exam-
ined this federal law found it unconstitutional 
under the principles in Casey and Stenberg, primar-
ily because of the vagueness of the definition and 
the lack of a health exception.4
As to the vagueness argument, Kennedy writes 
that the new law is no longer vague because it 
clarifies the distinction between the prohibited 
procedure (which he calls “intact D&E”) and stan-
dard D&E abortions because the former requires 
the delivery of an intact fetus, whereas the latter 
requires “the removal of fetal parts that are ripped 
from the fetus as they are pulled through the 
cervix.” In addition, the new federal law specifies 
fetal landmarks (e.g., the “navel”) instead of the 
vague description of a “substantial portion” of 
the “unborn child.” 4
Since the law applies to fetuses both before 
and after the point of viability, Kennedy concedes 
that under Casey the law would be unconstitu-
tional “if its purpose or effect is to place a sub-
stantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking 
an abortion before the fetus attains viability.” 4 
Kennedy finds Congress’s purpose is twofold: 
first, lawmakers wanted to “express respect for 
the dignity of human life” by outlawing “a 
method of abortion in which a fetus is killed 
just inches before completion of the birth pro-
cess,” because use of this procedure “will fur-
ther coarsen society to the humanity of not 
only newborns, but of all vulnerable and inno-
cent human life. . . .” Second, Congress want-
ed to protect medical ethics, finding that this 
procedure “confuses the medical, legal and ethi-
cal duties of physicians to preserve and promote 
life. . . .” 4
The key to Kennedy’s legal analysis is his con-
clusion that these reasons are constitutionally 
sufficient to justify the ban because under Casey 
“the State, from the inception of pregnancy, 
maintains its own regulatory interest in protect-
ing the life of the fetus that may become a child 
[and this interest] cannot be set at naught by in-
terpreting Casey’s requirement of a health excep-
tion so it becomes tantamount to allowing the 
doctor to choose the abortion method he or she 
might prefer.” 4
Kennedy then goes on to write that “respect 
for human life finds an ultimate expression in the 
bond of love the mother has for her child,” and 
that “while no reliable data” exist on the subject, 
“it seems unexceptionable to conclude some wom-
en come to regret their choice to abort the infant 
life they once created and sustained. . . . Severe 
depression and loss of esteem can follow.” Such 
regret, Justice Kennedy believes, can be caused 
or exacerbated if women later learn what the pro-
cedure entails, suggesting that physicians fail to 
describe it to patients because they “may prefer 
not to disclose precise details of the means [of 
abortion] that will be used. . . .” 4
The final, important issue is whether the pro-
hibition would “ever impose significant health 
risks on women” and whether physicians or Con-
gress should make this determination. Kennedy 
picks Congress: “The law need not give abortion 
doctors unfettered choice in the course of their 
medical practice, nor should it elevate their status 
above other physicians in the medical commu-
nity. . . . Medical uncertainty does not foreclose 
the exercise of legislative power in the abortion 
context any more than it does in other contexts.” 4 
Furthermore, Kennedy argues, the law does not 
impose an “undue burden” on women for an-
other reason: alternative ways of killing a fetus 
have not been prohibited. In his words, “If the 
intact D&E procedure is truly necessary in some 
circumstances, it appears likely an injection that 
kills the fetus is an alternative under the Act that 
allows the doctor to perform the procedure.” 4
justice ginsburg’s dissent
Writing for the four justices in the minority, Jus-
tice Ruth Bader Ginsburg observes, “Today’s de-
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cision is alarming. It refuses to take Casey and 
Stenberg seriously. It tolerates, indeed applauds, 
federal intervention to ban nationwide a proce-
dure found necessary and proper in certain cases 
by the American College of Obstetricians (ACOG). 
It blurs the line, firmly drawn in Casey, between 
previability and postviability abortions. And, for 
the first time since Roe, the Court blesses a pro-
hibition with no exception safeguarding a wom-
an’s health.” 4
Ginsburg argues that the majority of the Court 
has overruled the conclusion in Stenberg that a 
health exception is required when “substantial 
medical authority supports the proposition that 
banning a particular abortion procedure could 
endanger women’s health. . . .” 4 This conclusion, 
bolstered by evidence presented by nine profes-
sional organizations, including the ACOG, and 
conclusions by all three U.S. District Courts that 
heard evidence concerning the Act and its effects, 
directly contradicted the congressional declara-
tion that “there is no credible medical evidence 
that partial-birth abortions are safe or are safer 
than other abortion procedures.” Even Justice 
Kennedy agreed that Congress’s finding was un-
tenable.
Justice Ginsburg concludes that this leaves 
only “flimsy and transparent justifications” for 
upholding the ban. She rejects those justifica-
tions, arguing that the state’s interest in “preserv-
ing and promoting fetal life” cannot be furthered 
by a ban that targets only a method of abortion 
and that cannot save “a single fetus from de-
struction” by its own terms but may put women’s 
health at risk.4 Ultimately, she believes that the 
decision rests entirely on the proposition, never 
before enshrined in a majority opinion and ex-
plicitly repudiated in Casey, that “ethical and mor-
al concerns” unrelated to the government’s inter-
est in “preserving life” can overcome what had 
been considered fundamental rights of citizens.
The majority seeks to bolster its conclusion by 
describing pregnant women as in a fragile emo-
tional state that physicians may take advantage 
of by withholding information about abortion 
procedures. Justice Ginsburg concludes that the 
majority’s solution to this hypothetical problem 
is to “deprive women of the right to make an 
autonomous choice, even at the expense of their 
safety.” 4 She continues, “This way of thinking 
[that men must protect women by restricting their 
choices] reflects ancient notions about women’s 
place in the family and under the Constitution 
— ideas that have long since been discredited.” 4
Ginsburg further notes that the majority sim-
ply cannot contain its hostility to reproductive 
rights as articulated in Roe and Casey, calling phy-
sicians “abortion doctors,” describing the fetus 
as an “unborn child” and as a “baby,” labeling 
second-trimester abortions as “late term,” and 
dismissing “the reasoned medical judgments of 
highly trained doctors . . . as ‘preferences’ mo-
tivated by ‘mere convenience.’ ” 4
Ginsburg makes two final points. First, al-
though the Court invites a lawsuit to challenge 
the Act “as applied,” it gives “no clue” as to how 
such a lawsuit should be brought. Surely, she asks, 
“the Court cannot mean that no suit to chal-
lenge the ban [based on how it affects an actual 
woman or her physician] may be brought until 
a woman’s health is immediately jeopardized.” 
Second, she argues that the opinion threatens to 
undercut the “rule of law” and the “principle of 
stare decisis,” both of which the Court affirmed 
in Casey, concluding that, “A decision so at odds 
with our jurisprudence should not have staying 
power.” 4 As described in Casey, stare decisis is a 
doctrine that obligates courts to follow the prin-
ciples set forth in prior cases, called precedents, to 
assure continuity in the law, and precedents should 
not be abandoned under “political pressure” or as 
an “unprincipled emotional reaction.” 2
discussion
The major change in the law this opinion brings 
with it is the new willingness of Congress and 
the Court to disregard the health of pregnant 
women and the medical judgment of their physi-
cians.14-16 This departure from precedent was 
made possible by categorizing physicians as un-
principled “abortion doctors” and infantilizing 
pregnant women as incapable of making serious 
decisions about their lives and health. The major-
ity opinion ignores or marginalizes long-standing 
principles of constitutional law, substituting the 
personal morality of Justice Kennedy and four of 
his colleagues.
The majority asserts that giving Congress con-
stitutional authority to regulate medical practice 
is not new but identifies no case in which Con-
gress had ever outlawed a medical procedure. Its 
reliance on the more than 100-year-old case of 
Jacobson v. Massachusetts is especially inapt.17 Jacob-
health law, ethics, and human rights
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son was about mandatory smallpox vaccination 
during an epidemic. The statute had an excep-
tion for “children who present a certificate, 
signed by a registered physician, that they are 
unfit subjects for vaccination,” and the Court im-
plied that a similar medical exception would be 
constitutionally required for adults. It is not just 
abortion regulations that have had a health ex-
ception for physicians and their patients — all 
health regulations have.16-18
On the other hand, those who expect Roe to 
be overturned by this Court may be disappoint-
ed. Although Justice Alito has replaced Justice 
O’Connor and is likely to vote in the opposite 
direction on Roe-related issues, Justice Kennedy 
is the new swing vote on the Court, and he in-
sists that he is upholding the principles of Roe v. 
Wade as reaffirmed in Casey.3 Just as the ques-
tion of whether a specific abortion regulation was 
an “undue burden” was once a determination 
Justice O’Connor could effectively make for the 
Court, the meaning of Roe v. Wade is, at least for 
now, up to Justice Kennedy.
conclusions
Some physicians will surely be tempted to view 
the decision as a narrow victory for antiabortion 
forces that is unlikely to have more than a mar-
ginal effect on medical practice. This view is un-
derstandable but misses the potential broader im-
pact of the opinion on the regulation of medical 
practice and the doctor–patient relationship gen-
erally. Until this opinion, the Court recognized 
the importance of not interfering with medical 
judgments made by physicians to protect a pa-
tient’s interest.16 For the first time, the Court 
permits congressional judgment to replace med-
ical judgment.
For physicians who are disturbed or dismayed 
by this opinion — for example, the ACOG has 
termed it “shameful and incomprehensible” 19 — 
there are concrete actions to consider. One is to 
seek an amendment of the act in Congress to 
protect women’s health — for instance, by adding 
a specific exemption for cases in which “in the 
reasonable medical judgment of the attending 
physician, an alternative procedure poses a signif-
icant risk to the health of the pregnant woman.” 
Although it would be better simply to repeal 
the law, this amendment could actually pass be-
cause it permits legislators to be against using 
the despised procedure but at the same time pro-
tecting the health of women.
A second, admittedly much more difficult, re-
sponse is for physicians to become conscientious 
objectors in particular circumstances. This means 
doctors will do what is medically necessary to 
preserve and protect the lives and health of 
their patients as required by medical ethics, re-
gardless of what politicians attempt to dictate. 
Unlike antiabortion conscientious objection, this 
kind does not come with legal immunity. There 
is danger of prosecution, and this approach will 
be a viable option only if physicians are assured 
of the financial and moral support of the medical 
profession (especially of the ACOG) and, I think, 
of the legal profession as well. I believe the Amer-
ican Bar Association should agree as an organi-
zation to actively support any physician who is 
prosecuted under this law for doing what he or 
she believed at the time was in the patient’s best 
medical interests. This strategy means that a phy-
sician who is accused of violating this law would 
challenge its constitutionality as part of his or 
her defense in the criminal action, what the 
Court seemed to mean by an “as applied” case.
Many state legislatures will now enact new 
laws restricting abortion access to see how far 
they can go, just as happened after Roe. Other 
states, especially those like New York that had 
made abortion legal before Roe, may codify the 
basic protections of Roe into state law.20 In anti-
Roe states, there are likely to be increased re-
quirements for physicians to present their pa-
tients with more and more information designed 
to discourage pregnant women from having abor-
tions, such as viewing ultrasonographic images 
of their fetuses. Some states will also attempt to 
outlaw other abortion procedures that the mem-
bers of their legislatures find personally or reli-
giously objectionable, including standard D&E. 
In the past, members of state legislatures could 
vote for all sorts of restrictions and bans, know-
ing that the courts would almost certainly find 
them unconstitutional. Thus, they could be pub-
licly in favor of abortion restrictions and at the 
same time privately assure their pro-choice con-
stituents that such restrictions would have no ef-
fect on women. Now that states (and Congress) 
have been given the green light to regulate med-
icine on the basis of their own views of morals 
and ethics, detached from medicine and science, 
these legislators may have to make real decisions. 
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For the sake of their patients and the profession 
of medicine, physicians will have to pay more 
attention to politics.
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